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A Theoretical Analysis of Preference Matching by Tourists 
and Destination Choice 
Abstract 
 How does the phenomenon of preference matching by tourists affect their choice between 
two possible destinations? We study this question. It costs less (more) to vacation in destination 𝐴 (𝐵). Tourists choose to either vacation in 𝐴 or 𝐵. They differ in their incomes. These incomes 
are uniformly distributed on the unit interval. Our analysis leads to four results. First, when the 
cost differential parameter satisfies a particular condition, both destinations are visited in the 
equilibrium. Second, when this parametric condition holds, in any equilibrium in which the mean 
income of the tourists varies across the two destinations, every tourist vacationing in 𝐴 has a lower 
income than every tourist vacationing in 𝐵. Third, there exists an income cutoff point and all 
tourists with lower (higher) incomes choose to vacation in 𝐴 (𝐵). Finally, in the equilibrium with 
income sorting, it is possible to make all tourists better off by modifying their destination choices. 
Keywords: Destination Choice, Income, Preference Matching, Tourism, Uncertainty  
JEL Codes: L83, D81 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Literature review 
Our paper focuses on some key issues that lie at the interface of the trinity of income, 
tourism, and destination choice. Therefore, before proceeding to the specific objective of this 
paper, we begin by discussing the existing literature on this trinity in two parts. First, we comment 
on the nexus between income and tourism. Second, we outline the extant research on the 
destination choices of tourists. 
A lot has now been written about the many connections between income and tourism. 
Looking at the nature and the extent of tourism within the different states of India, Dutta and Kar 
(2018) point out that the central government can play a major role in promoting tourism by making 
appropriate income transfers to the states where there has been local unrest. Nassani et al. (2018) 
empirically analyze sixteen counties that they contend are tourism oriented during the time period 
1990-2014. They first construct a “vulnerability index” which depends, in part, on the income 
inequality in a nation and then show that through this vulnerability index, income inequality affects 
the demand for international tourism. Gupta and Dutta (2019) utilize a two-sector, two-factor, 
static general equilibrium model to theoretically study a stylized less developed nation called 
“South.” Their analysis demonstrates that when capital is perfectly mobile across the two sectors 
of South and there is only a single traded good, tourism development in South raises national 
income in this country.  
Rivera and Tuazon (2019) use an empirical framework and point out that tourism can be 
designed to be pro-poor and thereby help improve the lives of low-income people. Kumar et al. 
(2020) use the so called ARDL bounds approach and empirically demonstrate that income has a 
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non-trivial impact on the demand for international tourism in small Pacific island nations such as 
the Cook Islands, Fiji, Tonga, and Vanuatu. In addition to the studies that we have just discussed, 
the work of Crouch (1995), Kim et al. (2011), Chang and Chen (2013), and Choudhry and Lew 
(2013) clearly shows that there exists a positive relationship between income and tourism. In this 
regard, it is worth pointing out that the research of Crouch (1992) demonstrates that discretionary 
income tends to play a big role in determining the demand for international tourism which, many 
now believe, is a luxury good.  
Moving on to the destination choices of tourists, Nicolau (2010) points out that income 
certainly impacts the destination choices made by tourists and that this impact is non-linear in 
nature. Van Loon and Rouwendal (2013) use statistical models and demonstrate that the domestic 
versus international destination choices of Dutch tourists depend greatly on a tourist’s education 
level and income. Based on a study of survey responses in the Backa region of Serbia, Djeri et al. 
(2014) use multivariate analysis and show that income affects four out of the five phases in 
decision-making about how individuals make choices about the selection of alternate destinations 
for the purpose of tourism. Zhuang et al. (2019) utilize structural equation modeling to study how 
what they call “tourism development” influences the choice between visiting either Puri or 
Varanasi, both of which are prominent destinations for religious tourism in India.  
Looking further at this destination choice question, we can ask how wealthy tourists make 
their destination choices. Here, the work of Buckley and Mossaz (2016) and the reporting of 
Divirgilio (2013), Jacobs (2018), and Woods (2019) demonstrates that wealthy individuals tend to 
visit destinations that are also visited by other wealthy individuals. Examples of such destinations 
include but are not limited to Aspen, Colorado, Kauai, Hawaii, and Lake Como, Italy. In other 
words, rich tourists like to vacation with other rich tourists.  
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The fact that wealthy tourists like to vacation with other wealthy tourists can be thought of 
as one kind of preference matching. This phenomenon tells us that individuals possessing a 
particular attribute---such as wealth---like to be around other individuals who also possess this 
same attribute. The reader should note that this is a general phenomenon in economics and regional 
science in the sense that it applies not only in the context of tourism but also in other areas such as 
residential and school choices.4  
Two points are now worth emphasizing. First, even though the existing literature in tourism 
has recognized this phenomenon of preference matching, to the best of our knowledge, there are 
no theoretical analyses of the impacts of preference matching on either the distribution of tourists 
or on the choice of destinations in a given economy. Second, even though the literature in regional 
science has studied several aspects of tourism and, in particular, its impact on regional economic 
growth and development, this literature too, as best as we can tell, has paid no attention to the 
phenomenon of preference matching.5 We are now in a position state our specific objective in this 
paper. 
1.2. Our objective 
Given the lacuna in the literature discussed in section 1.1, our primary objective in this 
paper is to analyze the impact of preference matching and income on the distribution of tourists in 
a theoretical model that explicitly accounts for two possible destinations.6 Section 2 delineates the 
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See Batabyal and Beladi (2019) for a recent analysis of preference matching in the context of residential choices.  
5
  
See Stoeckl (2007), Soboll et al. (2012), Feshari et al. (2016), and Powell et al. (2017) for recent examples of the kinds of tourism 
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is the objective we have just stated. By pursuing this objective, we intend to contribute to the existing theoretical literature in 
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theoretical framework that is adapted from the prior work of Batabyal and Beladi (2019). In this 
framework, it is less expensive to vacation in destination 𝐴 and more expensive to vacation in 
destination 𝐵. Consistent with the literature discussed in section 1.1, we are using the term 
“destination” loosely and therefore several interpretations of this term are possible. For instance, 
when viewed as cities, the two destinations could be Mumbai and New Delhi in India or Los 
Angeles and San Francisco in California. When viewed as states, the two destinations could be 
Utah and Wyoming in the United States of America or New South Wales and Victoria in Australia. 
Finally, when viewed as specific sites, the two destinations could be Grand Canyon National Park 
and Yellowstone National Park in the United States or the Kiyomizu-dera Buddhist Temple and 
the Kinkaku-ji Golden Pavilion Temple in Japan. 
Tourists choose freely to vacation in either the less expensive destination 𝐴 or in the more 
expensive destination 𝐵. However, they differ in their incomes and these random or stochastic 
incomes are assumed to be uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1]. 7 Section 3 shows that when 
a parameter in our model satisfies a particular condition (on which more below), both destinations 
are visited in the equilibrium. Section 4 supposes that the section 3 parametric condition holds and 
then demonstrates that in any equilibrium in which the mean8 income of the tourists varies across 
the two destinations, every tourist vacationing in the less expensive destination 𝐴 has a lower 
income than every tourist vacationing in the more expensive destination 𝐵. Section 5 solves for an 
income cutoff point 𝑀∗ and then points out that all tourists with incomes lower (higher) than this 
                                                             
tourism by concentrating on a hitherto unstudied problem. That said, we are not saying that the question of choosing between 
different destinations cannot be analyzed meaningfully using alternate means. The point to note is that as best as we can tell, the 
phenomenon of preference matching has never been used before to shed light on the choice between alternate destinations by 
tourists.  
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cutoff point choose to vacation in destination 𝐴 (𝐵). Section 6 points out that in the equilibrium 
with income sorting, it is possible to make every tourist better off by modifying their destination 
choices. Finally, section 7 summarizes our main results, discusses the five policy implications of 
our analysis, and then suggests two ways in which the research described in this paper might be 
extended.  
2. The Theoretical Framework 
 The aggregate economy of interest is made up of two destinations. We index these two 
destinations with the subscript 𝑖 where 𝑖 = 𝐴, 𝐵. The subscript 𝐴 denotes the less expensive or 
cheaper destination and the subscript 𝐵 denotes the more expensive destination. It costs 𝐶𝐴 > 0 to 
vacation in the cheaper destination and 𝐶𝐵 = 𝐶𝐴 + 𝜁 to vacation in the more expensive destination 
where 𝜁 > 0. We assume that 𝐶𝐴 and 𝐶𝐵 are both constant.9 
Tourists in our aggregate economy differ in terms of their incomes. These incomes, which 
we denote by 𝑀, are assumed to be uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1]. Consistent with the 
discussion in section 1.1, we emphasize that tourists in our aggregate economy care about the 
incomes of those vacationing in their chosen destination. The mean income of tourists vacationing 
in destination 𝑖 = 𝐴, 𝐵 is a function of the average value of 𝑀 in that destination and we denote 
this mean by ?̂?𝑖, 𝑖 = 𝐴, 𝐵.  
A tourist with income 𝑀 who chooses to vacation in destination 𝑖 with mean income ?̂?𝑖 
obtains total utility denoted by 𝑈𝑖 = (1 + 𝑀)(1 + ?̂?𝑖). We know that this same tourist incurs a 
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 𝐶𝐴 and 𝐶𝐵 are straightforward ways of capturing the idea that different destinations cost different amounts of money to visit. That 
said, we recognize that depending on the mode of transport (airplane, train, automobile) used, a particular destination such as 𝐴 
can cost different amounts of money to visit. One way to account for the idea that it can cost different amounts of money to visit a 
particular destination would be to think of 𝐶𝐴 and 𝐶𝐵 as the least expensive way of visiting either destination 𝐴 or destination 𝐵. 
However, since our fundamental objective here is to study some of the implications of preference matching, we do not dwell any 
further on this “mode of transport” issue.  
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cost when vacationing in destination 𝑖 that is given by 𝐶𝑖 . Hence, putting these two pieces of 
information together, this tourist’s net utility function is  𝑈𝑖 = (1 + 𝑀)(1 + ?̂?𝑖) − 𝐶𝑖.     (1) 
Two points about the net utility function described in equation (1), deserve further comment. First 
and consistent with our primary objective stated in section 1.2, this function captures the idea that 
tourists care about the incomes of those who are vacationing with them. Second and more 
specifically, wealthy tourists place a greater value on vacationing together with other wealthy 
tourists. These two points together explain how the net utility function in equation (1) displays the 
phenomenon of preference matching that we first alluded to in section 1.2.  
 Let us now discuss the above two points in greater detail. Suppose, for concreteness, that 
the mean income of tourists vacationing in destination 𝐴 (𝐵) is low (high). Then the preference 
matching phenomenon captured by equation (1) tells us that a wealthy tourist will prefer to 
vacation in destination 𝐵 and not 𝐴 because the mean income in destination 𝐵 is higher than it is 
in 𝐴 and this wealthy tourist’s utility is an increasing function of this higher mean income. Next, 
let us consider the case of a poor tourist. Will such an individual want to vacation in the destination 
where the mean income is high? Recall that it already costs more to vacation in the more expensive 
destination. The answer to the question just posed is no and this is what we show in detail in our 
analysis in sections 3 through 5 below. So, to conclude this discussion, in the equilibrium that we 
study, there is income sorting and therefore every tourist vacationing in the cheaper destination 𝐴 
has a lower income than every tourist vacationing in the more expensive destination 𝐵.  
 The net utility function in equation (1) is defined on income and costs because this 
description allows as to analyze the impacts of the phenomenon of preference matching that we 
are interested in, in a parsimonious manner. That said, given a particular study objective or 
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objectives (also see section 7), it is obviously possible to define the utility function on other 
variables. Our next task is to analyze a specific situation, involving the parameter 𝜁, in which 
tourists vacation in both the destinations in the equilibrium.10 
3. Tourists Vacation in Both Destinations 
Assume that all the tourists in our aggregate economy make their destination choices 
simultaneously. In addition, assume that the difference in the cost of vacationing between the 
cheaper destination 𝐴 and the more expensive destination 𝐵 is neither too high nor too low. We 
model this last point by specifying that the cost differential parameter lies in a particular interval 
or, in symbols, 𝜁𝜖(1 2⁄ , 1). We now want to analyze the destination choices of all the tourists in 
an equilibrium that is stable in the sense that no tourist wishes to move from his or her chosen 
destination given the destination choices of every other tourist in the aggregate economy.  
Let us begin the formal analysis by supposing that all the tourists are vacationing in the 
cheaper destination 𝐴. The expected income now is ?̂?𝐴 = 1 2⁄ . The point to recognize is that the 
poorest tourist will now have no incentive to vacation in the more expensive destination 𝐵. To 
confirm this point, observe that this tourist’s net utility from vacationing in the cheaper destination 𝐴 is  
 𝑈𝐴 = (1 + 0)(1 + ?̂?𝐴) − 𝐶𝐴 = 32 − 𝐶𝐴.     (2) 
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We clearly have not taken all the complexities of the destination choice and the related economic impacts into consideration in our 
theoretical modeling. Given our objective, stated in section 1.2, it is not necessary to do so. Moreover, our position is that a model 
that accounts for every complexity of the destination choice question will, very likely, be unwieldy and hence very difficult to work 
with. 
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In contrast, if this poorest tourist switches his or her destination to the more expensive destination 𝐵 then the expected income changes to ?̂?𝐵 = 0. Note that for the time being, we are considering 
the case in which all tourists are vacationing in the cheaper destination 𝐴. So, no tourist is choosing 
to vacation in destination 𝐵 and hence there are zero tourists in destination 𝐵. Also, the poorest 
tourist has zero income. Therefore, it follows that when this poorest tourist moves to destination 𝐵, the total number of tourists in destination 𝐵 consists of one individual with zero income. 
Therefore, the average income in destination 𝐵 with this single tourist with zero income is also 
zero and in symbols we have ?̂?𝐵 = 0. That said, the destination switching tourist’s net utility in 
the more expensive destination 𝐵 is  𝑈𝐵 = (1 + 0)(1 + 0) − 𝐶𝐴 − 𝜁 = 1 − 𝐶𝐴 − 𝜁,    (3) 
where the right-hand-side (RHS) follows from the fact that 𝐶𝐵 = 𝐶𝐴 + 𝜁. Comparing the RHSs of 
equations (2) and (3), it is clear that the poorest tourist is better off by vacationing in the cheaper 
destination 𝐴.  
 We can now ask the following question: what about the wealthiest tourist? When 
vacationing in destination 𝐴, this tourist’s net utility is 𝑈𝐴 = (1 + 1)(1 + ?̂?𝐴) − 𝐶𝐴 = 3 − 𝐶𝐴    (4) 
since ?̂?𝐴 = 1 2⁄ . In contrast, if this tourist switches and vacations in the more expensive 
destination 𝐵, then his or her net utility is  𝑈𝐵 = (1 + 1)(1 + 1) − 𝐶𝐴 − 𝜁 = 4 − 𝐶𝐴 − 𝜁   (5) 
because ?̂?𝐵 = 1. When the wealthiest tourist switches destinations from the cheaper destination 𝐴 
to the more expensive destination 𝐵, the total number of tourists in destination 𝐵 increases from 
zero to one and this one individual is the richest tourist whose income is one. This explains why 
we have ?̂?𝐵 = 1. Now, inspecting the RHSs of equations (4) and (5) we see that the net utility 
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from vacationing in the more expensive destination 𝐵 exceeds the net utility from vacationing in 
the cheaper destination 𝐴 when 𝜁 < 1. This result tells us that the wealthiest tourist in our model 
may have an incentive to vacation in destination 𝐵.  
 Using a line of reasoning that is similar to that employed above in this section, we infer 
that if all the tourists vacation in the more expensive destination 𝐵 then the wealthiest tourist will 
not profit by switching to vacation in the cheaper destination 𝐴. In contrast, the poorest tourist will 
benefit by choosing to vacation in destination 𝐴 as long as 𝜁 > 1 2⁄ . Thus, combining the claims 
we have made thus far in this section, we are able to prove that the tourists in our aggregate 
economy will voluntarily choose to vacation in both the destinations under study in equilibrium as 
long as the cost differential parameter 𝜁 lies in the interval (1 2⁄ , 1).  
Observe that our arguments thus far have two additional consequences for extreme or 
boundary values of 𝜁. First, when 𝜁 > 1, all the tourists in our aggregate economy will choose to 
vacation in the cheaper destination 𝐴 only. Second, when 𝜁 < 1 2⁄ , all the tourists will choose to 
vacation in the more expensive destination 𝐵 and destination 𝐴 will have no vacationers. Let us 
now analyze the attributes of the equilibrium when the condition 𝜁𝜖(1 2⁄ , 1) holds and the 
expected income of the tourists varies across the two destinations under study.  
4. Expected Income Varies Across the Two Destinations 
Our goal in this section is to demonstrate that when the expected income of all the tourists 
varies across the two destinations, every tourist vacationing in the less expensive destination 𝐴 
must have a lesser income than every tourist vacationing in the more expensive destination 𝐵. To 
establish this result, we continue with a proof by contradiction.11 To this end, assume that a tourist 
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with high income 𝑀𝐻 chooses to vacation in the cheaper destination 𝐴 and that a tourist with low 
income 𝑀𝐿 chooses to vacation in the more expensive destination 𝐵. This means that we have 𝑀𝐻 > 𝑀𝐿 .  
If the destination choices assumed in the previous paragraph represent an equilibrium then 
we must have (1 + 𝑀𝐻)(1 + ?̂?𝐴) − 𝐶𝐴 > (1 + 𝑀𝐻)(1 + ?̂?𝐵) − 𝐶𝐴 − 𝜁,   (6) 
and (1 + 𝑀𝐿)(1 + ?̂?𝐵) − 𝐶𝐴 − 𝜁 > (1 + 𝑀𝐿)(1 + ?̂?𝐴) − 𝐶𝐴.   (7) 
After a few steps of algebra, the inequalities in expressions (6) and (7) can be simplified to  
 𝜁1+𝑀𝐻 > ?̂?𝐵 − ?̂?𝐴 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ?̂?𝐵 − ?̂?𝐴 > 𝜁1+𝑀𝐿.    (8) 
 
The information conveyed by the two inequalities in expression (8) is that  
 𝜁1+𝑀𝐻 > 𝜁1+𝑀𝐿,       (9) 
 
which is clearly untrue. Hence, our initial assumption that a tourist with high income 𝑀𝐻 chooses 
to vacation in the cheaper destination 𝐴 and that a tourist with low income 𝑀𝐿 chooses to vacation 
in the more expensive destination 𝐵 cannot constitute an equilibrium.  
The above result tells us that when the parameter 𝜁𝜖(1 2⁄ , 1) and the expected income of 
the tourists in our model varies across the two destinations, every tourist choosing to vacation in 
the cheaper destination 𝐴 must have a lower income than every tourist choosing to vacation in the 
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more expensive destination 𝐵. We now solve for an income cutoff point 𝑀∗ and then demonstrate 
that all tourists who have incomes lower (higher) than this cutoff point choose to vacation in 
destination 𝐴 (𝐵). 
5. The Income Cutoff Point 
 To recapitulate, thus far we have shown that when the cost differential parameter is such 
that 𝜁𝜖(1 2⁄ , 1), the tourists in our aggregate economy choose to vacation in both destinations and 
that the total number of tourists is separated by income. Now assume that the highest income of 
the tourists vacationing in the cheaper destination 𝐴 is 𝑀∗. Then, it follows that the expected 
income of all the vacationers in this destination is (1 2⁄ )𝑀∗. Also, the expected income of all the 
tourists vacationing in the more expensive destination 𝐵 now is (1 2⁄ )(1 + 𝑀∗). Since 𝑀∗ is the 
income cutoff point, it is clear that the tourist with this level of income will be indifferent between 
vacationing in destination 𝐴 and 𝐵. In symbols, this indifference can be expressed as  
 (1 + 𝑀∗) (1 + 𝑀∗2 ) − 𝐶𝐴 = (1 + 𝑀∗) (1 + 1+𝑀∗2 ) − 𝐶𝐴 − 𝜁.   (10) 
 
Solving equation (10) for the income cutoff point 𝑀∗, we get  𝑀∗ = 2𝜁 − 1.       (11) 
 Combining our findings from sections 3 and 4 with equation (11), we deduce that all the 
tourists in our aggregate economy who have incomes greater than the cutoff point 𝑀∗ will choose 
to vacation in the more expensive destination 𝐵 and that those who have incomes lesser than this 
same cutoff point will choose to vacation in the cheaper destination 𝐴. Our final job in this paper 
is to demonstrate that in the equilibrium with income sorting, it is possible to make all the tourists 
in our aggregate economy better off by modifying their destination choices.  
14 
 
6. Making All Tourists Better Off  
 Before we proceed further, it is essential to stress that the equilibrium with income sorting12 
that we have been studying thus far cannot be bettered by simply moving a single tourist from one 
destination to the other. Why not? This is because the equilibrium under study is individually 
rational. This means that no tourist wishes to alter his or her destination choice given the 
destination choices of all the other tourists in our aggregate economy.  
 Given the discussion in the preceding paragraph, in order to make everyone better off, it 
will be necessary to move a group of tourists from one destination to the other. To this end, 
consider the scenario in which we get all the tourists to vacation in the cheaper destination 𝐴. This 
change obviously raises the utility of all the tourists presently vacationing in destination 𝐴 because 
the expected income in this destination rises. But what happens to the utility of tourists who are 
currently vacationing in the more expensive destination 𝐵? To find out, observe that our suggested 
change of destination from 𝐵 to 𝐴 benefits an arbitrary tourist vacationing in destination 𝐵, with 
income 𝑀, as long as the inequality  
 3(1+𝑀)2 − 𝐶𝐴 > (1 + 𝑀) (32 + 𝑀∗2 ) − 𝐶𝐴 − 𝜁     (12) 
 
is satisfied.  
 From equation (11), it follows that 𝑀∗ = 2𝜁 − 1. Utilizing this last value of 𝑀∗ to simplify 
the inequality in expression (12), we obtain  
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This “income sorting equilibrium” can also be thought of as a “destination choice equilibrium.”  
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12𝜁−1 > 𝑀.       (13) 
 
Inspecting the inequality in expression (13), we see that the ratio on the left-hand-side (LHS) 
reaches a minimum value of one when the cost differential parameter 𝜁 equals one. Hence, we 
infer that this inequality in expression (13) holds for all incomes 𝑀 ≤ 1. This last finding tells us 
that getting all the tourists in our aggregate economy to vacation in the cheaper destination 𝐴 is, in 
our model, a superior outcome relative to the outcome in which the tourists vacation in both 
destinations 𝐴 and 𝐵.  
 To intuitively see why this result holds, note that the decision to pick either destination 𝐴 
or 𝐵 by the tourists in our aggregate economy depends on the tradeoff between two factors---see 
equation (1)---that pull in opposite directions. The first factor is the desire to match preferences or 
vacation with other wealthy tourists and this factor increases a tourist’s utility. The second factor 
is the desire to stay away from a high cost destination because this high cost decreases a tourist’s 
utility. From the analysis in section 3, we know that when 𝜁 > 1, all the tourists will choose to 
vacation exclusively in the cheaper destination 𝐴 and that when 𝜁 < 1 2⁄ , all of these same tourists 
will choose to vacation in the more expensive destination 𝐵 only.  
 Putting the above information together, as 𝜁 steadily rises above 1 2,⁄  the second factor 
begins to dominate the first factor and the cheaper destination 𝐴 begins to look more attractive to 
a larger number of tourists. In the limiting case where 𝜁 equals one and beyond, the second factor 
swamps the first factor and hence no tourist wishes to vacation in the more expensive destination 𝐵. Put differently, by altering the income cutoff point 𝑀∗, it is possible to make all the tourists in 
our aggregate economy better off by getting them to vacation in the cheaper destination 𝐴. This 
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completes our discussion of the impact of preference matching and income on tourism when there 
are two potential destinations to contend with. 
7. Conclusions 
 In this paper, we theoretically studied the impact of preference matching and income on 
the distribution of tourists in an aggregate economy consisting of two potential destinations. It cost 
less (more) to vacation in destination 𝐴 (𝐵). Tourists freely chose to vacation in either destination 𝐴 or 𝐵. They differed in their incomes and these incomes were assumed to be uniformly distributed 
on the unit interval. Our analysis led to four results. First, when the cost differential parameter 
satisfied a specific condition, both destinations were visited in the equilibrium. Second, when this 
parametric condition held, in any equilibrium in which the expected income of the tourists varied 
across the two destinations, every tourist vacationing in destination 𝐴 had a lower income than 
every tourist vacationing in destination 𝐵. Third, there existed an income cutoff point and all 
tourists with lower (higher) incomes chose to vacation in destination 𝐴 (𝐵). Finally, in the 
equilibrium with income sorting, it was possible to make all tourists better off by modifying their 
destination choices.  
 Five policy implications arise from our analysis in this paper and they are as follows. First, 
when promoting different destinations to tourists, it makes sense for an appropriate authority (AA) 
to design the promotion materials in a way that emphasize the distinctive features of each 
destination. Second, because the tourists in our aggregate economy display an interest in 
preference matching, destinations that are more costly to vacation in ought to be marketed by the 
AA to relatively wealthy individuals. Third, if the AA would like all the destinations under his or 
her jurisdiction to be visited by tourists then this authority needs to take steps to ensure that 
differences in the cost of vacationing between the different destinations, are small. Fourth, if the 
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cost of vacationing in a particular destination is too high then the AA needs to understand that no 
tourist will want to vacation in such a destination. Finally, the only way in which the AA can 
improve upon the equilibrium in which tourists are sorted by their incomes involves ensuring that 
all the tourists in the aggregate economy vacation in the cheaper destination. However, this option 
is unlikely to be feasible from a practical standpoint.  
 The analysis in this paper can be extended in a number of different directions. Here are two 
suggestions for extending the theoretical research described here. First, it would be useful to extend 
our model by explicitly focusing on the case where the key choice confronting tourists is between 
any one of 𝑛 destinations where 𝑛 > 2. Second, it would also be helpful to consider the case in 
which a tourist’s utility function depends not only on income and costs but also on a number of 
destination-specific characteristics. Studies that analyze these aspects of the underlying problem 
about the vacation choices of tourists will increase our comprehension of the nexuses between a 
desire to match preferences on the one hand and the touristic appeal of alternate destinations on 
the other.  
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